Predatory lending: attempts to plug the money drain by Stephen O'Sullivan
redatory lending continues to capture attention
nationwide. Since it entered the spotlight in the
1990s, advocates, legislators, regulators, lawyers,
and lenders have intensified their activities
around the issue. Over the past year, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System initiated
amendments to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA); community groups, city councilors, and other
lawmakers proposed additional protections to curb abu-
sive lending practices; Georgia’s predatory lending law
came under scrutiny; and Household International and
Citigroup settled lawsuits (worth $700 million in total)
that alleged abusive lending practices.1
Why is predatory lending so heatedly debated? Besides
the sometimes devastating consequences of predatory
lending, the practice itself has evaded simple definition
and detection, allowing for a lot of debate about solu-
tions. This article reviews some of the issues involved in
isolating predatory lending and describes efforts under
way to curb the practice.
Predatory versus Subprime
Establishing an agreed-upon, standard definition for the
term “predatory lending” has not been easy. State and
federal regulators, financial institutions, mortgage indus-
try associations, and community groups all have different
views on what types of loan terms and activities they
consider to be traits of abusive lending. This lack of a
standard definition has made it almost impossible for reg-
ulators or legislators to determine what loans are, or are
not, predatory. As former U.S. Senator Phil Gramm has
commented on the issue, it is impossible to regulate
something that cannot be defined. The box on page 4
describes some loan terms and practices often associated
with predatory lending.
Part of the difficulty in defining predatory lending is
that many people mistakenly equate it with subprime
lending. In actuality, predatory lending is the rogue
component of subprime lending. Regulatory guidelines
describe subprime lending as the extension of credit to
“borrowers who exhibit characteristics indicating a sig-
nificantly higher risk of default than traditional bank
lending customers.” To compensate for these higher
risks, lenders charge higher rates and fees. Borrowers
benefit by qualifying for credit they otherwise wouldn’t
obtain, and lenders gain access to a new and potentially
profitable market. 
Subprime lending started proliferating in the 1990s.
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data show that
from 1993 to 2000, the number of subprime loans for
home purchases shot up by a factor of 19, from 16,000
to 306,000. The rise in subprime loans that are home-
equity loans has been less steep, increasing from 66,000
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sent a much larger segment of the
market. The subprime market con-
tinues to expand; its value in 2002
was estimated at $175 billion, or
about 10 percent of the total dollar
amount of the residential mortgage
market, according to the Mortgage
Industry Directory.
Federal Reserve Board Governor
Edward Gramlich has suggested that
the subprime market helped make it
possible for low-income and minor-
ity consumers, groups that tradition-
ally have had difficulty obtaining
mortgage credit, to obtain housing
loans at record levels. During the
rise in subprime lending from 1993
to 2000, the number of convention-
al home-purchase mortgage loans
going to lower-income borrowers
nearly doubled, while those to
upper-income borrowers increased
at a slower pace of two-thirds.
Further, conventional home mort-
gage loans increased 122 percent to
African-American borrowers and
147 percent to Hispanic borrowers.
Other factors, such as low interest
rates, advances in technology, and
greater competition also worked to
broaden access.2
The dark side of subprime lending is
that it acts as the umbrella under
which predatory lending finds cover.
Subprime lenders have been found
to target people in particular com-
munities and groups, regardless of
their ability to qualify for better
loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
have pointed out that between 30
and 50 percent of those who get
subprime loans could qualify for
prime rate loans, or at least loans
with lower interest rates. In a study
of the subprime market in Boston
from 1999 to 2001, “Borrowing
Trouble? III,” Jim Campen of the
University of Massachusetts –
Boston finds the subprime loan
share to upper-income blacks is 7.5
times greater than the subprime loan
share going to upper-income whites,
and three times greater than the
share going to lower-income whites. 
Both consumer advocates and
lenders look to mortgage delinquen-
cy and foreclosure data for valida-
tion about whether loan costs and
fees are warranted or excessive. For
example, U.S. foreclosure data
released by the Mortgage Bankers
Association of America show that
0.86 percent for all conventional
loans were foreclosed on during the
fourth quarter of 2002. Further
analysis reveals that only 0.54 per-
cent of conventional prime loans
were in foreclosure, whereas 7.79
percent of conventional subprime
loans were. Consumer advocates
point to this information and charge
that subprime lenders are saddling
borrowers with loans they cannot
afford. Lenders assert these data pro-
vide evidence of the higher risks
associated with subprime lending.
Detecting Predatory Lenders
Presumably, financial institutions try
to avoid being linked with the word
“predatory.” Such a stigma would be
hard to erase, and the institution
would be intensely scrutinized by
regulators and others, potentially
resulting in consumer lawsuits that
might force the company to shutter
its mortgage-lending operation. 
Despite the risks of running such
an operation, predatory lending
continues. In part, this is because a
majority of total residential mort-
gage originations occur outside the
realm of federal- and state-regulat-
ed financial institutions. Mortgage
brokers, for instance, are typically
licensed and examined by state
agencies, but the degree of moni-
toring varies from state to state. At
the federal level, the Federal Trade
Commission, an entity charged
with enforcing numerous federal
antitrust and consumer protection
laws, has oversight responsibility
for mortgage brokers and other
nonbank lenders. 
Much of the information about and
awareness of subprime lenders,
therefore, comes from annual reports
produced by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). Since 1993, HUD has identi-
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Defining Predatory Lending
In general, predatory lending refers to the actions of unscrupulous mortgage lenders and brokers in taking
advantage of poor, elderly, and unsophisticated borrowers. Here are some lending terms and practices typ-
ically considered predatory:
Excessive or unnecessary interest rates, points and fees, or insurance
Asset-based lending or equity stripping: lending without regard for the borrower’s ability to repay the loan
“Packing” a loan with concealed or unwarranted products and fees
Financing fees, charges, or insurance as part of the loan
“Flipping” a loan by repeatedly refinancing it, charging further fees
Balloon payments
Negative amortization
Increased interest rate after default
Certain prepayment penalties; modification fees; mandatory arbitration clauses
Deceptive or overly aggressive marketing tactics; engaging in fraud
Broker fees tied to interest rates










2001 178fied lenders who appear to specialize
in subprime lending. The list is pri-
marily compiled from industry trade
publications and HMDA data analy-
ses.3 HUD cautions against assuming
that these lenders carry out predato-
ry activities, and adds that its selec-
tion process is not systematic, leav-
ing room for error and omissions.
Regardless, many groups use the list
as a starting point when attempting
to uncover lenders in the predatory
market. The table on the facing page
shows HUD’s count of subprime
lenders for the past nine years.
Attempts to Rein in 
Predatory Lending 
Given the infrastructure of mortgage
lending today, local legislatures and
regulators have been making their
own attempts at limiting predatory
practices. They strive for a delicate
balance. If the scales are tipped too
heavily in one direction with rigid
regulations, legitimate subprime
products could be eliminated. Some
lenders might move out of particular
geographic areas, crimping the
availability of subprime credit. But if
the scales are tipped too much in the
other direction, the most vulnerable
borrowers could become victims of
lending scams and abuses.
Across the country, various legisla-
tures and regulatory groups have
taken different stances on the issue,
resulting in a patchwork of rules and
regulations. Financial institutions
and mortgage lenders have criticized
this hodgepodge of regulations,
claiming the rules hurt the borrow-
ers they intend to assist. So far,
about a dozen states and 10 cities
have laws and regulations (some
pending) against predatory lending. 
States have generally attempted to
limit predatory lending by expand-
ing the requirements of the federal
Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act (HOEPA). HOEPA,
along with HMDA, the other rele-
vant federal regulation, have recent-
ly been revised to allow for better
tracking of subprime lending activi-
ty, among other aims. (For sum-
maries of HOEPA and HMDA, see the
sidebar “Federal Regulations” on
page 6.) States make HOEPA more
stringent either by lowering the
terms that trigger a high-cost loan ,
thereby requiring additional disclo-
sures, or by classifying additional
practices as predatory. 
The effects of these laws vary by
state, and have been interpreted dif-
ferently. The Center for Responsible
Lending estimates that North
Carolina’s anti-predatory law saved
borrowers $100 million in total abu-
sive lending costs in its first year of
operation (the law was passed in
1999). It reports that the new law did
not result in a mass exodus of sub-
prime lenders from the state. It
claims North Carolina ranked sixth
highest among the 50 states for sub-
prime activity by the end of 2000.
Other sources, however, such as the
Mortgage Bankers Association,
attribute a major lender’s 2001 exit
from the subprime market to stricter
state anti-predatory lending laws,
including North Carolina’s. 
The Georgia Fair Lending Act
(GFLA), as first issued, seemed likely
to be an example of the mortgage
industry’s claim that firmer regula-
tion would restrict credit overall. But
the law was recently amended, and
outcomes of the revised law remain
to be seen. When the GFLA became
effective in October 2002, it was the
strictest anti-predatory law in the
nation. Two specific provisions of
the GFLA were especially tough. The
first provision was “pass-through
liability.” This meant that liability for
violations of the law moved with
ownership of the loan, from mort-
gage lenders to loan servicers to
investors in mortgage-backed securi-
ties. The second provision concerned
penalties for violations of the law. 
These provisions had unintended
consequences. Numerous mortgage
lenders either restricted their lending
activities in Georgia or withdrew out-
right from the state. Many of those
that continued lending increased
rates and fees to compensate for
greater risks. In addition, lack of
competition within the state may
have led to increased mortgage costs. 
Credit-market tightening spread out-
side the state as well. Standard &
Poors stopped assigning credit rat-
ings to asset-backed securitizations
that included conforming mortgages
originated in Georgia because it said
it was unable to assess the risks.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
stopped purchasing high-cost loans
originated in Georgia. Fortunately,
the growing liquidity drought was
halted in March 2003, when
Georgia’s governor signed an
amendment to the law, eliminating
the detrimental provisions. 
In addition to action at the state
level, cities from Oakland to New
York City have passed local ordi-
nances intended to curtail predatory
lending. The scope of these ordi-
nances varies, but many take the
approach used in New York City. The
city establishes what it considers to
be a predatory loan and then pro-
hibits the city from doing business
with lenders who originate those
loans nor with the investment firms
with which they are associated.
What’s Next
Industry and consumer advocates are
currently squaring off on federal
legislation called the “Responsible
Lending Act of 2003,” introduced in
February by Representatives Robert
Ney, R-Ohio, and Ken Lucas, D-
Kentucky.  Consumer groups argue
the legislation intends to preempt all
local action against predatory lend-
ing without taking significant steps to
end the practice. Industry groups
argue that they cannot continue oper-
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Subprime lenders have been found to target people in particular
communities and groups, regardless of their
ability to qualify for better loans.6c  &  b
ating with different sets of rules in
different places, and cite Georgia as a
case study. Cities are not waiting to
express their concerns. City Councils
in Boston and Bridgeport, among a
few others, have passed resolutions
opposing federal preemption.  
Stephen O’Sullivan is a member of
the Supervision and Regulation
Department at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston. 
1. Household settled a suit alleging
predatory lending practices brought by a
group of attorneys general and regula-
tors from more than two dozen states on
October 11, 2002. Citigroup settled a
case brought by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) that alleged predatory
lending practices by the Associates, a
lender purchased by Citigroup in
November 2000 and merged into the
CitiFinancial unit. Household and
Citigroup settled their cases without
admitting any wrongdoing in the
amounts of $484 million and $215 mil-
lion, respectively. The $215 million set-
tlement is the largest in FTC history.
2. Information in this paragraph (and
HMDA statistics in the prior one) are
from a speech on predatory lending made
by Federal Reserve Governor Gramlich
before the Housing Bureau for Seniors
Conference on January 18, 2002. The
speech is available at www.federalreserve.
gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002.
3. This information was collected from
the website, www.huduser.org/datasets/
manu.html. HUD used a number of
HMDA analyses to screen potential sub-
prime lenders. First, HUD assumed sub-
prime lenders typically have higher
denial rates and lower origination rates
than prime lenders. Second, HUD
assumed that home refinance loans gen-
erally account for higher shares of sub-
prime lenders’ total originations than
prime lenders’ originations. To verify
this belief, HUD then called the lenders
or reviewed their web pages to deter-
mine if they specialized in subprime
lending. A large number of lenders told
HUD they offer subprime loans, but that
these loans do not constitute a large per-
centage of their overall conventional
mortgage originations. In cases where
lenders offered both prime and subprime
loans, HUD identified lenders as sub-
prime lenders if they reported at least
half of their conventional originations as
subprime loans. This criteria eliminated
some lenders who have very large (but
not chiefly) subprime businesses. Most
lenders identified themselves as primari-
ly a subprime or a prime lender.
Federal Regulations
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)
In 1994, Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA) in an attempt to curtail loan abuses stemming from excessive
costs. When the law passed, one of the biggest misconceptions was that
HOEPA abolished high-cost loans. HOEPA does not eliminate high-cost
loans or make them illegal. HOEPA was implemented as part of Regulation
Z, Truth in Lending, which establishes four requirements for these types
of loans:
* First, HOEPA establishes two separate thresholds for determining what
type of loan is considered a high-cost loan. One trigger is the annual per-
centage rate (APR), and the other is the amount of points and fees. 
* Second, if a loan is determined to be high cost, the lender must provide
written notice informing the borrower of a mortgage on his home, and of
the possibility that the borrower could lose his house.  
* Third, if high-cost provisions are triggered, certain loan terms are not per-
mitted. These include balloon payments, negative amortization, prepayment
penalties, increased interest rate after default, and rebates made by a
method less favorable than the actuarial method.  
* Fourth, three practices are not permitted with these types of loans: (1)
making asset-based loans, (2) directly paying loan proceeds to home-
improvement contractors, and (3) selling or assigning the loan without pro-
viding a notice informing the purchaser or assignee that the loan is subject
to “special rules under the Truth in Lending Act.” 
In 2001, the Federal Reserve Board amended Regulation Z to broaden the
scope of loans subject to HOEPA’s regulatory protections. The Board adjust-
ed the two triggers that define high-cost loans: APR and points and fees. It
lowered the APR threshold for first-lien loans from 10 percentage points
over the rate of a Treasury bond of comparable maturity to 8 percentage
points. (The trigger for subordinate lien loans remained at 10 percentage
points.) In addition, the Board amended the method of calculating points
and fees. The new regulation classifies optional single-premium credit
insurance as a fee that must be included in the calculation of total points
and fees. The amendments, which became effective on October 1, 2002,
also prohibit these loans from being refinanced within a one year period. 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
The Federal Reserve Board also amended Regulation C, which implements
the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). The focus of the
amendments (effective January 1, 2004) is to allow for more effective col-
lection and monitoring of subprime and potential predatory lending trends.
The changes require lenders to collect additional data for potential high-
cost loans. The amendments:
* set thresholds for determining the loans for which financial institutions
must report loan pricing data. Institutions must report loan-pricing data if
the rate spread (the difference between the APR on a loan and the yield on
comparable Treasury securities) equals or exceeds 3 percentage points for
first-lien loans or 5 percentage points for subordinate-lien loans. 
* require lenders to report the lien status of applications and originated loans. 
* require lenders to ask applicants their ethnicity, race, and sex in applica-
tions taken by telephone. (This became effective January 1, 2003.)